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It is a standard criticism of Descartes' dream ar-
gument that it must necessarily fail because it is in-
consistent with itself: it has to assume the truth of 
what it sets out to deny. It concludes that there is 
no difference between dreaming and waking and that our 
experiences may be false delusions, while the premises, 
which liken waking to dreaming and assert the illusory 
character of the latter, presuppose that there is such 
a difference. As Ryle said in criticism of the argu-
ment from illusion:1 just as it makes no sense to talk 
of counterfeit coins when there are no genuine ones to 
contrast them with, so it makes no sense to talk of il-
lusory experiences like dreams without waking and 
veridical ones to contrast them with. 
I believe that, despite several attempts to argue 
the contrary, this criticism is correct. However, I 
also believe that it is a criticism that needs stating 
with some care. This is because the inconsistency in 
the dream argument is present at more than one point, 
and because it appears to be present at a point where 
in fact it is not. I shall try to show this in Part I 
of what follows. In Part II I shall make some remarks 
about Descartes' procedure in Meditation 1 arising from 
reflections on why he committed the error in question. 
I 
In the passage where Descartes presents the dream 
argument he argues as follows. First he notes that he 
sleeps and that there are occasions when he thinks he 
is awake and in the presence of real objects but is in 
fact asleep and dreaming. Then he says that that does 
not appear to be the case now, for what happens in 
sleep does not appear "so clear and so distinct" as his 
present experiences. But while reflecting on this he 
reminds himself that he has had similar experiences in 
his dreams and been deceived by them; "dwelling 
carefully" on this reflection he sees "so manifestly 
that there are no certain indications by v/hich we may 
clearly distinguish wakefulness from sleep" that he is 
"lost in astonishment." His astonishment is such, he 
says, that it is "almost capable" of persuading him 
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that he is now dreaming, and from this he goes on to 
say, "now let us assume that we are asleep and that all 
these particulars, e.g., that we open our eyes, shake 
our head, extend our hands, and so on, are but false 
delusions."2 
Descartes betrays a certain hesitancy in the use of 
the phrases "almost capable" and "now let us assume." 
How far does he think the argument justifies the con-
clusions that we are asleep and that our experiences 
are false delusions? This is not as important a 
question as it may seem, for what matters here is not 
the degree of force the argument has but what its 
structure is meant to be. Descartes clearly intends 
its structure to be such that it establishes at least 
the possibility of the conclusions, and hence that it 
allows one to assume them. So he does intend the argu-
ment to be taken as establishing this possibility, even 
if he hesitates about how strong a possibility it is. 
It is as an argument intended to be taken in this way 
that is under examination here. 
Notice, then, first of all, that the fact that we 
are sometimes deceived into believing we are awake when 
really asleep, and the fact dreams are illusions, are 
not used to establish that there are no "certain 
indications" for distinguishing waking from sleeping; 
this is something Descartes "sees" when he directs his 
attention to instances of waking experiences and 
dreams. If this does not seem sufficiently clear from 
the text, it can be made clearer if one notes that 
omitting any reference to the facts in question does 
not change anything here. Descartes writes: "I remind 
myself that on many occasions I have in sleep been 
deceived by similar illusions, and in dwelling care-
fully on this reflection I see so manifestly. . . . " 
Despite the impression given by Descartes' words, one 
could replace "I have in sleep been deceived by similar 
illusions" with "I have in sleep had similar impres-
sions" and not affect at all the "seeing" that there 
are no "certain indications." 
The second comment I want to make follows from 
this. The claim that there are no certain indications 
is a distinct stage of the argument; it is the first 
point Descartes needs to establish so that, on the 
basis of it, he can go on to draw the conclusions he 
wants. In other words, his argument has two stages in 
it: the first stage (1) ends in the claim that there 
are no certain indications for distinguishing dreaming 
and waking, and the second stage (2) draws, as a result 
of this, the inferences (a) that we are now, or may now 
be, dreaming, and (b) that what we experience may be 
false delusions. That (1) is a first and separate 
stage, necessary to establish what is to follow in (2), 
is, I think, clear enough, but it is well to have this 
explicitly set out, so that there is no doubt about it. 
In some analyses this has not always been made evident. 
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However, if this is the case, and the dream argument is 
double in the way indicated, at what point, if at all, 
does it commit the inconsistency of which it is ac-
cused? In (1), or (2), or both? 
To take (1) first of all. Might the very claim 
that there are no certain indications to distinguish 
waking from dreaming be inconsistent, or hide an im-
plicit inconsistency? Some seem to think so, for what 
this claim amounts to is that there is no real diff-
erence between dreaming and waking; but to be able to 
claim this one has to take each class of experiences 
separately—i.e., dreams and waking experiences—and 
compare them in order to look for the presence or ab-
sence of distinguishing marks, and one could not do 
this if they were not different experiences and dif-
ferent in a way we could detect. Accordingly, it would 
be inconsistent to go on and say that they were not 
really different after all. In other words, the very 
fact that we can speak of dreams on the one hand and 
waking experiences on the other is a sign that they are 
different. This is, I take it, one of the points 
Austin is making in a passage of Sense and Sensibilia.3 
The inconsistency may, however, be only apparent 
and not very serious, because the claim can be pre-
sented in such a way that it need not deny the distinc-
tion in the same sense in which it has to presuppose 
it. This may be seen if one views what is going on as 
a sort of testing of an hypothesis. One may take the 
ordinary common-sense distinction between dreaming and 
waking (which may work well enough at this level), and 
see if there really is a hard and fast distinction 
there after all, one that will stand up to sceptical 
doubt. This is, in fact, Descartes' strategy and as 
such it is fair enough. One may then construe the 
reasoning as follows. If the distinction is genuine, 
there must be some difference that enables us to estab-
lish this with certainty; on examination one finds that 
this is not the case (because, for example, there is 
nothing any waking experience has that some dream may 
not have). So, contrary to appearances, the distinc-
tion is not genuine after all. Thus one does not deny 
in the same sense what one has to suppose, for one only 
needs to suppose the apparent difference that is made 
at the level of common-sense, and one only denies that 
there is a genuine difference lying behind it. Con-
strued in this way the argument is not inconsistent. 
It would be, of course, if it were taken as denying in 
the same sense what it has to suppose, but my point 
here is simply that one need not take it like this, and 
that therefore up to this stage, whatever other diffi-
culties it may labor under, the argument is at least 
not inconsistent. Since it would otherwise fall at the 
first hurdle, I will assume from now on that this is 
how (1) is to be taken. 
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If (1), as so construed, is not inconsistent, what 
about (2)? First it must be remembered that (2) is an 
inference from (1). It uses (1) as its basis and pre-
supposes that it is true; for it is only when one has 
shown that there is nothing certain to distinguish 
dreaming and waking that one can go on to conclude that 
we may now be dreaming, and that as a result all our 
experiences may be illusions. I think this must be 
stressed, for the nature of the logical order of (2) to 
(1) determines how one is to set about assessing (2), 
namely that since (1) is presupposed we must assess (2) 
on the supposition that (1) is true. Well then, 
granted this, what does it tell us about (2)? Within 
(2) there are two parts; (2a) is a separate point from 
(2b) as is clear from this, that if one assents to (2a) 
one has not eo ipso assented to (2b), for one needs in 
addition the further premise that dreams are illusory. 
This premise may seem too obvious to require stating, 
but that it is required nevertheless does show that 
(2a) and (2b) are different steps in the argument. 
To take (2a) first then. How is it supposed to 
follow from (1)? Since (1) says that there are no cer-
tain indications for distinguishing dreaming and wak-
ing, and (2a) says that therefore we may now be dream-
ing, it appears we need some such conditional premise 
as: if there are no certain indications, then we may 
now be dreaming. Once this conditional is made ex-
plicit, it can be seen that it is false; the consequent 
here stated is not the consequent of this antecedent. 
If there is nothing certain to distinguish dreaming and 
waking, then there is nothing certain to show that 
dreaming is a different sort of experience from waking, 
and so nothing certain to show that, when we are talk-
ing of dreams, we are talking of anything different 
from what we talk of when we are talking of waking 
experiences. In other words, there is nothing certain 
to show that the terms are not synonymous.4 If, there-
fore, one wants to follow the dream argument through, 
as Descartes does, what one must take seriously is not 
the possibility that we are now dreaming as opposed to 
being awake, but the possibility that the terms 
'waking' and 'dreaming' are synonyms. 
This has two immediate consequences of some impor-
tance. First it means that it does not matter which 
term one uses to describe one's experience; since they 
are synonyms either will do. Second it means that, 
whichever term is used, one cannot use it as if it 
stood in opposition to, or excluded, the other; syno-
nyms are equivalent, not contrasting, terms. Des-
cartes, however, proceeds in a way that contradicts 
both these consequences. He only gives one of the al-
ternatives, that we are now dreaming, and makes no men-
tion of the fact that in the context, the other, that 
we are now awake, is just as good; and, more seriously, 
he implies that the one he gives excludes the other. 
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that to say we are now dreaming is to deny that we are 
now awake. This is where he commits the inconsistency 
of which he is accused: his argument reguires him to 
treat 'waking' and 'dreaming' as synonymous, but he 
proceeds to do the opposite. The above conditional 
premise is false, in other words, because the conse-
quent which Descartes gives clashes with the antecedent 
instead of following from it. 
The extent to which Descartes is inconsistent here 
is made more evident by (2b). To say that our ex-
periences are, or may be, illusory requires, as has 
been said, that it be true both that we are dreaming 
and that dreams are illusions. But the first of these 
is false in the way it is taken, for it is taken as ex-
cluding being awake, which, in the context, it can no 
longer do, and the second requires one to commit the 
same error again. Ordinarily if we were asked to say 
why we believe dreams to be illusory we would reply 
that we do so by contrasting them with our waking ex-
periences, that we know dreams are illusory because 
when we wake up we find things are not as we dreamt 
them. We thus say dreams are illusory because we refer 
to waking experiences as a class of experiences that 
are distinct from them and veridical. But it is no 
longer possible to do this, for, as a result of (]), 
'waking experiences' and 'dreams' must be treated as 
synonymous expressions. Hence one cannot talk of the 
former in opposition to the latter, nor can one appeal 
to the former as if it signified a distinct sort of ex-
perience by reference to which one could establish the 
illusory character of the latter. 
One can illustrate the illegitimacy of Descartes' 
procedure in the dream argument by noting that it is 
possible, on the basis of (1), to give an exactly 
parallel argument that would come to the opposite 
conclusion. Instead of the proposition that we are 
dreaming, one takes the logically permissible alterna-
tive, that we are awake (for as synonymous these two 
say the same), and instead of the premise that dreams 
are illusory, one takes the premise that waking ex-
periences are veridical. Now as far as the facts ap-
pealed to are concerned, however inconsistent that ap-
peal may be here, this latter premise has the same 
status as the former (indeed it has, if anything, a 
higher status, for it is by our veridical waking ex-
periences that we judge that dreams are illusory, and 
not vice versa). Hence if it is legitimate to use the 
former, IT must also be legitimate to use the latter. 
Taking this together with the premise that we are 
awake, one has the result that our experiences, includ-
ing our dreams, are veridical. Now as one must allow 
this alternative way of proceeding from (1) to stand if 
one allows the way Descartes proceeds from (1) to 
stand, one consequently gets the nonsensical result 
that our experiences, both waking and dreaming, are 
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veridical as well as illusory, and at the same time. 
But neither way must be allowed to stand, for both are 
ruled out by (1) itself, and for the same reason, that 
they are inconsistent with it. 
One may summarize the result of the above discus-
sion as follows. Once it has been asserted that there 
is nothing certain to distinguish dreaming and waking, 
which is only the first part of the dream argument, the 
rest of that argument has to be rejected. One cannot 
go on to conclude that we are now dreaming, if by that 
one intends to rule out our also being awake, nor can 
one go on to conclude that our experiences are 
illusory. All there is left to say is that there are 
experiences which are equally correctly described as 
dreaming or waking. Whether these experiences are il-
lusory or veridical it is not possible to say as far as 
the dream argument is concerned. There may be some way 
of detecting this, but if so it has to be established 
independently; the dream argument does not provide one. 
The inconsistency in the dream argument that viti-
ates it is apt to be missed. First, beside the real 
inconsistency, there is an apparent one, and it is easy 
to confuse the two. Second, sufficient attention is 
not always paid to the question what the consequences 
of (1) really are. This is because in one sense the 
conclusion that we are now dreaming is validly deduced 
from (1), for since it is, in the context, synonymous 
with the conclusion that we are now awake, it makes no 
difference which one is said; both are equally correct. 
It is not validly deduced, however, if it is taken as 
not being synonymous and so as ruling out saying we are 
awake. This is the way it is taken by Descartes, and 
it is because of this that the argument fails. 
Now while it is important to notice the inconsis-
tency correctly, it is also important to notice pre-
cisely what, in pointing it out, one has succeeded in 
doing. One has only shown that one cannot consistently 
assert (1) and go on to assert (2), one has not shown 
(and this must be emphasized because the opposite can 
easily be supposed) that one cannot consistently assert 
(1). On the contrary one can, and if someone wanted to 
assert it, he could, perhaps, be accused of ignoring 
the facts or of committing himself to undesirable con-
sequences, but he could not be accused of being incon-
sistent. 
II 
Why did Descartes commit the error involved in his 
dream argument? Possibly he just failed to notice it, 
but though this may be true enough, l think one can 
point out good reasons why he should have failed to 
notice it, reasons relating to the purposes for which 
he uses it in Meditation I_. It is to an examination of 
these that I now wish to turn. 
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It is Descartes* intention in Meditation X t o 
overthrow the existing foundations of knowledge. I 
think one must describe his intention like that, and 
not say, for instance, that it is to show the existing 
foundations are inadequate, because Descartes does not 
just want to question the foundations, but actually to 
remove them from his and his readers' minds, so that he 
and they will be free to accept the new ones Descartes 
wishes to put in their place. This is clear enough 
from the way he speaks about Meditation i within that 
Meditation and elsewhere,5 and also from his well-known 
advice to his readers to spend some months in reading 
it. As Kenny has rightly remarked, the doubt is "a 
meditative technique, a form of thought therapy,"6 and 
as Gilson observes, Meditation I is "not a theory to 
understand, but an exercise-Eo practice,"7 thereby cor-
rectly drawing attention to the fact that it has as 
much in common with the Spiritual Exercises of St. 
Ignatius Loyola, used by Descartes * Jesuit teachers, as 
with treatises written by philosophers. The purpose of 
the doubt is to rid the mind of false beliefs and their 
inadequate foundations, so that it will be free to ac-
cept new, certain foundations and true beliefs that are 
true because founded on them. 
Given that this is so, and that it is the senses 
that were the foundations of the philosophy of the day 
(as Descartes notes in the Discourse6), what Descartes 
needs is arguments that will remove that acceptance of 
the senses. The dream argument does serve this func-
tion, if one takes it as sound, as many, including 
Descartes, seem to have done. But it is not sound, or 
rather only part of it is sound (at least to the extent 
it is not inconsistent), and the question arises as to 
whether it would serve the same function if this part 
alone, namely part (1), were presented. The answer 
must be no, for then the result would be that 'waking* 
and 'dreaming' were synonymous terms, not that waking 
experiences might be illusory. Such a conclusion will 
not remove from the mind its confidence in the senses; 
what it will do is put the mind in the same disposition 
towards both dreaming and waking, and make it ready to 
accept or reject them when there is reason to do one or 
the other. The dream argument itself gives no such 
reason. As this result is not what Descartes wants for 
his purpose, it helps to explain why he should not have 
been interested in an argument that only led to this 
result, and why he should have wanted to go further, 
though in doing so he fell unavoidably into incon-
sistency. 
There is, however, a deeper reason, related to what 
he does in the immediately succeeding paragraphs, why 
Descartes needs to have the full dream argument with 
its conclusion that our experiences are illusory. He 
goes on to suggest that, supposing all our waking ex-
periences are "false delusions," it still does not fol-
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low that they are altogether false, for what they re-
present contains true elements, just as dreams, though 
illusory, contain true elements: dreams are like 
paintings which, though imaginary, take their elements 
from real life. It is important to note that there is 
here an exactly similar fallacy as in the dream argu-
ment proper. To show that waking experiences may be 
illusory, Descartes had to use the proposition that 
dreams are illusory when he was no longer in a position 
to do so; and to show that waking experiences, though 
illusory, still represent something real, he has to as-
sume the proposition that dreams represent something 
real when he is equally no longer able to do so. We 
know that dreams contain elements that represent what 
is real (as eyes, head and hands) because we are able 
to refer to our waking experiences as a contrasting and 
true set of experiences in order to persuade ourselves 
of this, but as dreaming and waking are not, in the 
context, contrasting terms, this can no longer be done. 
But why did Descartes compound his error like this, 
especially as the passage does not seem very relevant? 
It does not advance the primary sceptical intention of 
the Meditation since no more sceptical arguments are 
introduced until the argument from an omnipotent God 
several lines later, and, moreover, since the effect of 
it is not to remove confidence in the senses but actu-
ally, in some measure, to restore it. However, 
Descartes does, it seems to me, have good reasons for 
what he is doing at this point, for he achieves in par-
ticular three things, which advance his purpose in 
another way. 
The first is that he introduces the notion of a 
representative theory of perception. It is insinuated 
into the reader's mind that if perception is of any-
thing real, it is so, not because we perceive real 
things directly, but because we perceive them in-
directly, by perceiving images that represent something 
real. A representative theory of perception is not 
only part of Descartes' developed philosophy; it is 
vital to that philosophy in the way it lays the founda-
tions for his physics. Descartes must suppose percep-
tion is representative because he contends that only 
the mathematical properties in material things are 
real, the sensible properties are not in things but in 
the mind only. But if we perceived things directly (as 
was generally supposed in the philosophy of his day), 
this could not be true for things would have the sensi-
ble properties we perceive in them just as much as the 
mathematical ones. That we do not perceive external 
things immediately but only ideas in the mind is taken 
for granted throughout the rest of the Meditations, but 
it is nowhere argued for (for instance^ in Meditation 
III Descartes says that what he had come to doubt was 
not that lie had perceptions in his mind but that there 
were things outside him from which they proceeded and 
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to which they v/ere entirely similar9). The only argu-
ment is here in Meditation I, which relies on the 
analogy with dreams, but as Ras been shown, this argu-
ment is fallacious. 
The second point is that the parts of our experi-
ence that Descartes lists as being real are all mathe-
matical properties; sensible ones are passed over in 
silence. No argument is given for this discrimination, 
though of course it is a cardinal contention of 
Cartesian physics. The third point follows from this, 
namely that the mathematical sciences (geometry and 
arithmetic) are superior to the other sciences, for 
they are not overthrown by the sceptical arguments 
given so far. Even if our waking experiences are illu-
sions yet the mathematical properties in them are real, 
and it is with these that geometry and arithmetic deal. 
Thus is insinuated into the reader's mind Descartes' 
hierarchy of the sciences, and the foundation is laid 
for his later claim that a physics, astronomy and medi-
cine based on mathematics would be superior to those 
sciences not founded on mathematics, such as was the 
case in his own day. Although he does present a fur-
ther sceptical argument for doubting the truths of 
mathematics, yet this doubt does not remove the hier-
archy he has set up; even if doubtful, like everything 
else before the discovery of the cogito, mathematics is 
far less doubtful than other things. 
These three contentions are all dependent, in the 
way Descartes presents them, on the conclusion of the 
dream argument. We can thus see that this conclusion 
is being used not merely to overthrow trust in the 
senses, but in such a way that any reader who goes 
along with Descartes up to this point will already have 
started to believe central Cartesian doctrines, doc-
trines that only explicitly emerge later. The reader is being prepared, or softened up, so to speak, for 
what is to follow, and while ostensibly he is only be-
ing given arguments to make him reject existing beliefs 
(beliefs typical of the philosophy of the day), in fact 
he is being induced, at the same time, and by virtue of 
the very same arguments, to replace those beliefs with 
quite different ones, and ones that are typically 
Cartesian. 
Further remarks on these same lines could be made 
about Meditation I and would further reveal the clever-
ness of its construction. The point to emphasize, how-
ever, is simply this: Meditation ^ is so put together 
that he who assents to the arguments in it has thereby 
assented to certain principal beliefs of Cartesian 
physics without necessarily realizing it. That 
Descartes knew that he was doing this is attested to by 
what he says in a letter to Mersenne: 
Between you and me, I shall tell you that these 
six Meditations contain all the foundations of my 
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physics. But please, one must not say this; for 
those who favour Aristotle would perhaps make 
more difficulty about approving them. I hope 
that my readers will imperceptibly become ac-
customed to my principles, and will recognize 
their truth before they realize that they destroy 
Aristotle's principles.10 
In view of this it is not surprising that he should 
urge his readers to meditate on Meditation I for sev-
eral months, for whoever does this and lets the ideas 
in it sink deeply into his mind (as Jesuits by practic-
ing the Spiritual Exercises let the ideas in that sink 
deeply into their minds), will already have advanced a 
considerable distance towards becoming a Cartesian, in 
particular with respect to physics, and one roust not 
forget that it is his physics that Descartes considers 
to be of most importance and which he most wants to 
promote. 
Descartes then clearly intended that more should be 
present in the Meditations, between the lines as it 
were, than is obvious on the surface, and that more 
should go on in his readers' minds as a result than 
they would immediately be aware of. I suggest that 
what is going on here in Meditation I in the use of the 
dream argument is part of this overall intention. 
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